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Law, Smart Technology, and Circular Economy: All Watched Over By 
Machines of Loving Grace? 
This paper examines how circular economics addresses and uses smart 
technology, and demonstrates the lack of consideration given to ownership issues 
in such contexts. The extent to which circular economic ideals require controlling 
goods down-stream will be exposed. Following this is analysis of the 
ramifications of smart technology, illustrated with recent examples of control 
through smart technology. This leads to a critique of the US Supreme Court’s 
recent decision on patent exhaustion Impression Products v Lexmark alongside 
the CJEU’s decision in UsedSoft on copyright, addressing implications for 
contracting practices. The article concludes by urging close comparison of 
claimed benefits arising from circular economic approaches to smart technology 
with the potential costs of control (or lack thereof) of novel technologies. 
Keywords: Circular economy, smart technology, ownership, goods 
1. Introduction 
This article considers law and smart technology,1 as seen through the lens of the 
increasingly prominent concept of circular economy. In light of a growing body of 
scholarship highlighting the importance of analysing the relationship between law and 
technology,2 and recognising the effect of technological developments in constructing 
                                                 
1 One useful early (hence the now rather quaint quotation marks) examination was Susan W 
Brenner, Law in an Era of “Smart” Technology (OUP 2007). See now Mireille 
Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law (Edward Elgar 2015). 
2 See generally Donald G Gifford, ‘Technological Triggers to Tort Revolutions: Steam 
Locomotives, Autonomous Vehicles, and Accident Compensation’ (2018) Journal of Tort 
Law (forthcoming) <doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2017-0029>; Eric Tucker, ‘Uber and the 
Unmaking and Remaking of Taxi Capitalisms: Technology, Law and Resistance in 
Historical Perspective’ in Derek McKee, Finn Makela and Teresa Scassa (eds), Law and 
the “Sharing Economy”: Regulating Online Market Platforms (University of Ottawa 
Press, forthcoming) <ssrn.com/abstract=3012558>; J Armour, ‘Corporate Governance and 
and enhancing the effective operation of circular economic practices, this article will 
consider the impact of connections and breakages between law and technology. 
Through exploration of the concepts, ideas, structures, and practices of circular 
economy, particularly as expressed in the report by the Ellen MacArthur Foundation 
(the leading think tank on circular economy) entitled Intelligent Assets: Unlocking the 
circular economy potential,3 this article addresses two themes. First: circular economy 
requires a paradigmatic change to the nature and role of ownership and control of 
tangible goods, something now achievable through manipulation of intangible aspects 
of smart technology ie software. Second: such changes raise questions about the 
potential negative effects of circular economic practices. In light of considerable 
growing governmental interest in circular economy,4 this analysis is particularly timely. 
The next section outlines circular economic thought regarding smart technology, 
and shows how extending corporate control over goods is both essential to circular 
economics generally and a driving force behind circular economic treatment of the 
potential of smart technology in particular. The third section explores the practical 
implications of, and possible broader theoretical concerns with, smart technologies. 
These concerns are illustrated by real-world examples of commercial practices along 
with analysis of doctrinal tension between intellectual property and contract. At the 
heart of this analysis is a dual quandary: whether and to what extent we are willing to 
                                                                                                                                               
Technological Risks’ (23 Feb 2017) <www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-
blog/blog/2017/02/corporate-governance-and-technological-risks>; Lyria Bennett Moses, 
‘Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological Change?’ (2007) 8 Minn J L Sci & Tech 
589. All URLs accessed 14 August 2018.  
3 Ellen MacArthur Foundation, Intelligent Assets: Unlocking the circular economy potential (8 
February 2016) <www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/publications>. 
4 The EU had announced almost a billion euros in funding for circular economy: 
<europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-4123_en.htm> (October 27, 2017). 
give up (or are powerless to prevent changes to) control over tangible goods in order to 
access the putative benefits of smart technology and circular economics. 
A final introductory point can be afforded on the question of terminology. The 
terms “smart technology” its cognate “smart goods” will be used throughout. 
Alternatives do exist: Mainwaring and Clarke have proposed the term eObjects.5 I have 
previously written about ‘integrated goods’.6 Furthermore, the next section will examine 
the implications of the use of ‘intelligent assets’ in circular economic literature. But 
“smart goods” appears quite venerable,7 and “smart technology” appears prevalent in 
general discourse.8 What seems to be common to these different terminologies though is 
that they are all attempting to address the introduction of digital aspects to previously 
analogue objects. Additionally, whilst we can identify doctrinal division between 
“dumb goods”, and digital products for the purposes of inter alia the Consumer Rights 
                                                 
5 Kayleen Manwaring, ‘A legal analysis of socio-technological change arising out of eObjects’ 
(5 January 2016) UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2016-15 <ssrn.com/abstract=2690024>; 
Kayleen Manwaring and Roger Clarke, ‘Surfing the third wave of computing: a 
framework for research into networked eObjects’ (2015) 31 Computer Law & Security 
Review 586. 
6 Sean Thomas, ‘Security Interests and Intellectual Property: Proposals for Reform’ (2017) 37 
Legal Studies 214, 217: ‘goods that have extensive and potentially novel forms of 
integration between the physical functionality of the goods and the software enabling the 
functionality’. 
7 Jean Braucher, ‘When Your Refrigerator Orders Groceries Online and Your Car Dials 911 
After an Accident: Do We Really Need New Law for the World of Smart Goods?’ (2002) 
8 Wash U J of L and Policy 8 (2002) 241. 
8  A Google search (2 July 2018) for “eObjects” reveals approximately 63400 hits. A search for 
“smart goods” reveals approximately 78800 hits. However, a search for “smart 
technology” gives 6710000 hits. It is acknowledged this cannot be a serious statistical 
point, but the prevalence for “smart technology” in advertising (as opposed to “eObjects”) 
is revealing: see e.g. <www.pcworld.co.uk/gbuk/smart-tech/smart-tech-1072-c.html>. 
Act 2015,9 such a distinction does not help with the sort of “things” considered herein 
(which would sit somewhere between the two concepts employed by the 2015 Act). In 
the absence of legislative or judicial action identifying, clarifying and defining a 
particular term (whether smart goods, eObjects, or whatever), it is more productive to 
focus on how digitalisation (since it is that which is common to all terms) provides new 
routes to control of things, and the implications of such control. 
2. The Circular Economy and “Intelligent Assets” 
Circular economics draws on a variety of academic and intellectual antecedents.10 
According to the Ellen MacArthur Foundation a circular economy is  
characterised, more than defined, as an economy that is restorative and 
regenerative by design and which aims to keep products, components and materials 
at their highest utility and value at all times, distinguishing between technical and 
biological cycles. It is conceived as a continuous positive development cycle that 
preserves and enhances natural capital, optimises resource yields and minimises 
system risks by managing finite stocks and renewable flows. It works effectively at 
every scale.11 
A number of legal issues clearly arise here; surprisingly they have not been subject to 
                                                 
9 Section 2 (8): ‘“Goods” means any tangible moveable items…’; (9) ‘“Digital content” means 
data which are produced and supplied in digital form.’ 
10 See eg Michael Braungart and William McDonough, Cradle to Cradle: Remaking the Way 
We Make Things ([2002] Vintage 2009). See further 
<www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/>. 
11 Intelligent Assets (n 3) 18. See further eg Julian Kirchherr, Denise Reike and Marko Hekkert, 
‘Conceptualizing the circular economy: An analysis of 114 definitions’ (2017) 127 
Resources, Conservation & Recycling 221; Callie Babbitt, Gabrielle Gaustad, Angela 
Fisher, Gang Liu, Weiqiang Chen (eds), ‘Sustainable Resource Management and the 
Circular Economy’ (2018) 135 Resources, Conservation & Recycling 1-346. 
much exploration.12 Clearly, there are substantial implications for the legal frameworks 
dealing with waste,13 especially the complex issues concerning digital waste. However, 
this article focuses on the implications of so-called ‘intelligent assets’ in circular 
economy, and examination of the Intelligent Assets report shows how the digital 
elements of smart goods will be utilised to shift towards a product-as-a-service model 
that is central to circular economics. Such digital elements facilitate the extension of 
control over goods, covering how the goods are used and even if they can be used at all. 
The commercial reality of the importance of digital control mechanisms, enforceable by 
both technological and legal methods, is plain to see. However, the precise legal form of 
such control, and any corresponding normative questions about the validity of such 
control, are far murkier issues.  
The first step is to ask, what are ‘intelligent assets’? An effective Internet of 
Things (“IoT”)14 renders more viable circular economic practices,15 but ‘intelligent 
assets’ is a broader concept:  
                                                 
12 There heterodox intellectual foundation of circular economy means there are a wide variety of 
potential explanations. See eg Chris Backes, Law for a Circular Economy (Eleven 
International Publishing 2017) <www.uu.nl/sites/default/files/rgl-ucowsl-backes-
law_for_a_circular_economy.pdf>. From a business perspective, see Peter Lacy and Jakob 
Rutqvist, Waste to Wealth: The Circular Economy Advantage (Palgrave MacMillan 2015). 
13 See eg Katrien Steenmans, Jane Marriott and Rosalind Malcolm, ‘Commodification of Waste: 
Legal and Theoretical Approaches to Industrial Symbiosis as part of a Circular Economy’ 
(9 June 2017) Working paper presented at the SMART conference ‘Life-cycle based 
management and reporting for sustainable business’, 29-30 November 2016 
<ssrn.com/abstract=2983631> 
14 Intelligent Assets (n 3) 15: ‘The networked connection of physical objects ... all objects, 
systems and processes that are exchanging information through the Internet’.  
15 Intelligent Assets (n 3) 8-9; Lacy and Rutqvist (n 12) 25. See further fn 77 and accompanying 
text. 
Physical objects that are able to sense, record and communicate information about 
themselves and/or their surroundings. This definition incorporates IoT objects but 
also includes assets that are not continuously transmitting information, and things 
that do not feature wireless communication.16 
Thus smart technology enables a ‘virtualised infrastructure that governs assets use and 
movements along the value chain.’17 An initial point to make here is the use of ‘assets’. 
This word, as opposed to goods, or objects, or things, implies a commercial 
conceptualisation of smart technology. This in turn is indicative of the heavily pro-
commercial orientation of the Ellen MacArthur Foundation as well as other proponents 
of circular economy.18 (A glance at the website for the Ellen MacArthur Foundation 
reveals the support provided by considerable swathes of global corporate power.19) 
Such interests will be piqued not necessarily by the environmental benefits potentially 
on offer, but because the changes wrought by the revolution of digitalisation have the 
‘the power to redefine value generation’,20 through the capacity to remove ‘barriers that 
prevent sharing, leasing and performance models’.21 As Stahel, one of the leaders in 
developing the concept of circular economy, has put it:  
A performance economy goes a step further by selling goods (or molecules) as 
services through rent, lease and share business models. The manufacturer retains 
ownership of the product and its embodied resources and thus carries the 
responsibility for the costs of risks and waste. In addition to design and reuse, the 
                                                 
16 Intelligent Assets (n 3) 15 
17 ibid 13. 
18 See also eg Lacy and Rutqvist (n 12). 
19 See eg <www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/about/partners>. See also Kirchherr et al (n 11) 
229: ‘… CE’s link to sustainable development is weak … most authors see CE as an 
avenue for economic prosperity … [especially] among practitioner definitions.’ 
20 Intelligent Assets (n 3) 13.  
21 ibid 19. 
performance economy focuses on solutions instead of products, and makes its 
profits from sufficiency, such as waste prevention.22 
Such models of commercial activity are not uncommon, especially in high-value mobile 
asset transactions (eg aircraft and locomotive leasing). However, intriguingly, in the 
context of circular economic thinking such models (a) appear to require a revolutionary 
approach to ownership structures and concepts, and (b) will be extended to a vast array 
of goods. Whilst it could be argued that there is little novelty in utilising transactional 
structures other than simple sale, the application of such processes to low value goods 
will be a step-change. 
The potentially revolutionary impact on ownership structures and concepts has 
been recognised by the geographers Gregson, Crang, Fuller and Holmes, who argue 
moves towards circular economies require ‘nothing short of a wholesale transformation 
of the basis of contemporary capitalism and consumption’.23 Such claims might not be 
hyperbolic: 
[Michelin] wants to add sensors to its tyres, to understand wear over time. For 
customers this is great. They will learn when to rotate tyres or replace them – 
unique to their specific driving conditions. This saves money and improves safety. 
But there is more to play for. Armed with usage data, the company is even better 
                                                 
22 W R Stahel, “The Circular Economy” at <www.nature.com/news/the-circular-economy-
1.19594> (23 March 2016). 
23 Nicky Gregson, Mike Crang, Sara Fuller and Helen Holmes, ‘Interrogating the circular 
economy: the moral economy of resources recovery in the EU’ (2015) 44 Economy and 
Society 218, 224. See also Kersty Hobson, ‘Closing the loop or squaring the circle? 
Locating generative spaces for the circular economy’ (2016) 40 Progress in Human 
Geography 88, 94: ‘if the CE really requires a fundamental transformation of how 
resources are thought about and utilized, exploring the manifold – and often dispersed and 
experimental – ways such transformations can and are taking place constitutes a vital and 
missing component of CE debates.’ 
equipped to shift its business model from selling tyres to leasing them (which it 
began before sensors made this model even more attractive). After all, GE and 
Rolls-Royce don’t sell jet engines but lease them with service contracts on the side 
– why not tyres too? The data collected by the sensors tell the company how the 
tyres can best be maintained. The consequence of this shift in business model is 
profound. The tyre company now has a vital commercial interest in making tyres to 
last as long as possible, since the firm still owns them. And it has a new financial 
interest in using materials and processes that make recycling old tyres as efficient 
as possible. … These sort of ‘triple play’ wins – for consumers, companies and 
society – will become commonplace as the Internet of Things and big data 
increasingly become a part of everyday life. As such, the Internet of Things could 
become the ‘soul’ that animates objects in the circular economy.24 
This illustration concerns not just ownership of data, but also issues concerning 
ownership of goods. The importance of ownership and control of goods, and not just 
data, is also revealed in comments by Neil Crocket, CEO of The Digital Catapult:25 
The coming years will see new, systematic, whole-life IoT models emerge – 
models that could dramatically change the way we produce, own, use, repair, and 
trade assets. Looking forward, IoT platforms that enable us to track our assets all 
the way along supply chains are emerging. This type of technology will start to 
allow us to establish and certify the pedigree of an asset (eg the circularity of the 
asset), putting us in a position where we can begin to create policy and tax 
incentives around how assets are being designed, utilised and managed along 
supply chains and across asset use cycles.26 
Tracking and certifying the ‘pedigree’ of assets clearly impacts on ownership and thus 
value.27  
                                                 
24 Intelligent Assets (n 3) 21.  
25 <www.digitalcatapultcentre.org.uk/>.  
26 Intelligent Assets (n 3) 26. 
27 ibid 31. 
The potential of blockchain technologies is of considerable importance here. A 
considerable volume of literature has accompanied blockchain developments,28 and this 
article will not provide a detailed examination of blockchain. Instead a generally 
positive understanding of blockchain is adopted, in that whilst there are numerous 
problems with blockchains,29 there is clearly immense scope for commercial application 
of blockchain.30  
                                                 
28 See eg Michael J Casey and Paul Vigna, The Truth Machine: The Blockchain and the Future 
of Everything (Harper Collins 2018); Iris H-Y Chiu, ‘A new era in fintech payment 
innovations? A perspective from the institutions and regulation of payment systems’ 
(2017) 9 Law, Innovation and Technology 190; Dirk A Zetzsche, Ross P Buckley, and 
Douglas W Arner, ‘The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of 
Blockchain’ (2017-18) U Illinois L Rev (forthcoming) <ssrn.com/abstract=3018214>; 
Kelvin F K Low & Ernie G S Teo, ‘Bitcoins and other cryptocurrencies as property?’ 
(2017) 9 Law, Innovation and Technology 235; Lawrence J Trautman and Alvin C 
Harrell, ‘Bitcoin Versus Regulated Payment Systems: What Gives?’ (2017) 38(3) Cardozo 
L Rev 1041; Jean L Schroeder, ‘Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code’ (2016) 24 U 
Miami Business L Rev 1.  
29 See eg Intelligent Assets (n 3) 11-12; 41-45 (competing interests in constructing, applying, 
and modifying the technical and legal codes underlying blockchain transactions need to be 
balanced); Government Science Office, Distributed ledger technology: beyond blockchain. 
A report by the UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser (19 January 2016) 
<www.gov.uk/government/news/distributed-ledger-technology-beyond-block-chain> 6-9; 
Adam Greenfield, Radical Technologies: The design of everyday life (Verso 2017) 159-
191; Low and Teo (n 28) 259-264 (problem of “forking” in blockchains). See generally eg 
Karen Yeung, ‘Algorithmic Regulation: A Critical Interrogation’ (2018) Regulation and 
Governance (forthcoming) <doi:10.1111/rego.12158 >; Robert Brauneis and Ellen P 
Goodman, ‘Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City’ (2018) 20 Yale Journal of Law 
& Technology 103; Pierluigi Cuccuru, ‘Beyond bitcoin: an early overview on smart 
contracts’ (2017) 25 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 179; Mark 
Giancaspro, ‘Is a “smart contract” really a smart idea? Insights from a legal perspective’ 
(2017) 33 Computer Law & Security Review 825; Robert P Bartlett, Adair Morse, Richard 
Stanton, and Nancy Wallace, ‘Consumer Lending Discrimination in the FinTech Era’ (8 
December 2017) UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper <ssrn.com/abstract=3063448>. 
For the purposes of this article and focusing on circular economic practices it 
suffices to note two possible uses of blockchains. On one hand, using blockchain for 
payments will help in circular economic contexts. Nicolas Cary, co-founder of 
Blockchain, is quoted in the Intelligent Assets report: ‘For intelligent assets to create 
value in the circular economy the development of an open and global payment protocol 
is required. The technology behind the Bitcoin blockchain has [this] potential’.31 On the 
other hand, blockchain technologies provide a valuable potential mechanism for 
tracking and recording transactions and disposition of goods.32 This information could 
then be utilised in order to provide more effective and directed control, through accurate 
identification of relevant goods.33 In Casey and Vigna’s words: ‘A blockchain-based 
system becomes the Internet of Things’ immutable seal’,34 and the circular economy 
‘will hinge on the transparency and information flows that blockchain systems allow.’35 
Combined, these features raise the possibility that access and use of smart goods will 
                                                                                                                                               
30 Distributed ledger technology (n 29) 5-6; Steve Mansfield-Devine, ‘Beyond Bitcoin: using 
blockchain technology to provide assurance in the commercial world’ [2017] Computer 
Fraud & Security 14. See also Angela Monaghan, ‘UK in strong position to be leader in 
crypto economy, report says’ The Guardian (16 July 2018) 
<www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jul/16/uk-strong-position-leader-crypto-
economy-global-hub-blockchain-technology-report-says>.  
31 Intelligent Assets (n 3) 43, and also at 66-67 (expanding on this). See also, at 49, the example 
of Provenance (www.provenance.org), that uses blockchain to identify assets, which 
potentially could create ‘an open, secure global registry for all material items.’ 
32 See eg Casey and Vigna (n 28) 81. 
33 ibid 115: ‘In their vision [ie blockchain maximalists, who consider the possible 
interchangeability of tokens across ledgers], all of our physical assets – our cars, boats, 
houses – as well as intangible assets such as brands, can be represented as secure digital 
assets on an immutable blockchain and traded directly with other assets, with their prices 
set by a matrix of billions of buyer and sellers.’ 
34 ibid 126. 
35 ibid 147. 
depend on the intangible record of the blockchain. We must therefore be wary of how, 
in Greenfield’s elegant phrase, ‘gradients of access will be inscribed on the physical 
world.’36 
In this context we can see a dual challenge to law’s institutional governance of 
ownership of things.37 First is the possible divorce of ownership from any specific state 
or institution: ownership, such that it can be said to exist in blockchain,38 may well 
become privatised. Secondly, this form of private ownership enables long-term down-
stream control: goods are colonised, but not by law’s empire.39 Instead we will have a 
new multifaceted and diffuse imperator; law gets demoted to being a local prefect. As 
Reed, Sathyanarayan, Ruan and Collins point out law is an impurity in blockchains; 
blockchains operate most effectively when they can and do ignore law.40 One result 
could be, in Fairfield’s terminology, ‘bitproperty’, with blockchains enabling effectively 
costless and decentralised title registries.41 It is not too great a conceptual distance (or 
                                                 
36 Greenfield (n 29) 155. 
37 cf James G H Griffin, ‘The future of technological law: The machine state’ (2014) 28 Int Rev 
Law, Computers & Technology 299. 
38 cf Chris Reed, Umamahesh Sathyanarayan, Shuhui Ruan and Justine Collins, ‘Beyond 
BitCoin – legal impurities and off-chain assets’ (2018) 26 Int J Law and Information 
Technology 160. 
39 Here the allusion is less to Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire ([1986] Hart Publishing 1998), 
than to Sir William Jones, Essay on the Law of Bailments (1781) 144: ‘if Law be a 
science, and really deserve so sublime a name, it must be founded on principle, and claim 
an exalted rank in the empire of reason; but if it be merely an unconnected series of 
decrees and ordinances, its use may remain, though its dignity be lessened’. 
40 Reed et al (n 38). Cf Distributed ledger technology (n 29) 42: ‘distributed ledger systems 
differ from the conventional financial system in that they are ruled by technical code rather 
than legal code.’ 
41 Joshua A T Fairfield, ‘BitProperty’ (2015) 88 So Cal L Rev 805. See also Rod Thomas and 
Charlie Huang, ‘Blockchain, the Borg collective and digitalisation of land registries’ 
even a practical one) between title registries and what would be a new style of digital 
rights management, with the dangers there of corporate content control.42 This techno-
regulation creates a general challenge to the Rule of Law itself,43 as well as the specific 
institutions of ownership. The potential effects of this are expressed well by Wright and 
De Filippi: 
In the case of smart property, however, ownership could be both defined and 
managed by source code. A person who qualifies as the technological owner (as 
opposed to the legal owner) of smart property enjoys absolute sovereignty over that 
resource, which cannot be seized by anyone unless specifically provided for by the 
underlying code. But code can also be used to implement a series of technological 
arrangements that might ultimately limit the exercise of property rights over a 
particular object. For instance, access to property can be programmatically limited 
to specific users or device, or even be limited to a person who is identified in a 
record on a blockchain. When brought to the extreme, every piece of property 
could be tied to a potential kill switch, whereby property could be disabled or 
divested remotely through the simple click of a button or a computer algorithm. In 
                                                                                                                                               
[2017] Conv 14; Distributed ledger technology (n 29) 69; Aaron Wright and Primavera De 
Filippi, ‘Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia’ (10 
March 2015) <ssrn.com/abstract=2580664>.  
42 Wright and De Filippi (n 41) 32-33. 
43 Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘Law as Information in the Era of Data-Driven Agency’ (2016) 79 
MLR 1, 2: ‘[data-driven agency] will drain the life from the law, turning it into a 
handmaiden of governance (that fashionable term meaning anything to anybody), 
devouring the procedural kernel of the Rule of Law’. See also Hildebrandt (n 1) 9 (noting 
law’s impotence in the face of smart technology). For a rich and compelling critical 
analysis of the dangers of technology negatively impacting on inter alia human dignity 
through imposition of control mechanisms, see eg Roger Brownsword, ‘In the year 2061: 
from law to technological management’ (2015) 7 Law, Innovation and Technology 1; 
Roger Brownsword, ‘Technological Management and the Rule of Law’ (2016) 8 Law, 
Innovation and Technology 100; Roger Brownsword, ‘From Erewhon to AlphaGo: for the 
sake of human dignity, should we destroy the machines’ (2017) 9 Law, Innovation and 
Technology 117. 
such a world, property ownership could vanish, replaced by a web of temporary 
leasehold interests governed by contracts.44 
Here the ideological shift of the relationship between ownership and use in circular 
economics can be exposed. The references to blockchain’s potential for circular 
economic practices should be understood not as a claim that circular economics is only 
possible through use of blockchain, or that blockchain will invariably lead to circular 
economies. Instead, it must be recognised that blockchain is merely one of many 
possible mechanisms, legal and technological, which can be used to generate the 
structures of control of goods down chains of transactions necessary for circular 
economies. The central idea underlying circular economics, especially as applied to 
smart goods, is that of control of use. Consider this statement from the Intelligent Assets 
report: ‘Imagine a world in which all high-value assets belong to their manufacturer, 
who is incentivised to maintain and improve them on an ongoing basis.’45 This is the 
objective for corporate participation in circular economy: exercising long-term control 
over tangible value-bearing assets. The reference to ‘high-value assets’ though diverts 
attention from the fact everyday goods may see the greatest impact: 
lifts, escalators, fridges, lighting and heating systems, desks, chairs, phones and 
laptops could be owned and tracked by their manufacturer, who will either 
                                                 
44 Wright and De Filippi (n 41) 35. 
45 Intelligent Assets (n 3) 37. Additionally: ‘Performance-based business models – where a 
supplier retains ownership of the product and the customer pays on a per-use (or 
performance) basis – provide the supplier with a fixed contract revenue stream while 
offering incentives to maintain, simplify and increase the reliability and productivity of the 
product. Done right, it also reduces total asset costs, while increasing profitability and 
customer service value. The retained ownership can enable, but is not critical for, the 
taking back of products after use and refurbishing/remanufacturing them before taking 
them to market again.’ 
maintain and improve them or take them back and reuse them when your company 
decides it wants to get new ones or move to a different location. And the family 
housing could be much cheaper because the construction company owns and tracks 
the materials to reuse or sell at the building’s end of life.46 
The Intelligent Assets report also refers to the printer manufacturer HP’s “Instant Ink” 
service, which operates on a subscription-based model which reduced waste and 
supposedly strengthened customer relations.47 Such models are not uncommon,48 but 
they may not be welcomed by consumers. HP’s model prohibited the use of generic ink 
cartridges, by using a unilateral software upgrade to the embedded software; clearly a 
functional removal of ownership and extension of corporate control. This led to an 
extraordinary consumer backlash,49 forcing HP to perform a spectacular U-turn.50 
Nevertheless, the tenor of the Intelligent Assets report is that such models are 
valuable, and this harmonises with other analyses of circular economy, such as Lacy 
and Rutqvist’s Waste to Wealth: The Circular Economy Advantage.51 They note that 
companies will ‘[enable customers] to make the most out of products; facilitate trade 
between users; supply services that monetize goods not in use; offer convenient buy-
                                                 
46 ibid 61.  
47 ibid 39. 
48 Lacy and Rutqvist (n 12) 57, noting Ricoh’s use of such a model. See also eg Dave Lee, ‘I 
subscribe, therefore I am?’ BBC News (14 July 2018) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
44829976>.   
49 Alex Hern, ‘HP “timebomb” prevents inkjet printers from using unofficial cartridges’ The 
Guardian (20 September 2016) <www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/20/hp-
inkjet-printers-unofficial-cartridges-software-update>. 
50 Dave Lee, ‘HP apologises for ink-blocking update’ BBC News (29 September 2016) 
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-37503139>.  
51 Lacy and Rutqvist (n 12).  
back solutions; and sell services instead of products.’52 This theme continues 
throughout: consumers will ‘see how trading ownership of products for access to them 
can translate into greater convenience, little concern over maintenance and repair, less 
clutter in their homes, and more money in their pockets.’53 Central to this revolutionary 
shift is the development of “Product as a Service” transactional models. As Braungart 
and McDonough put it:  
Instead of assuming that all products are to be bought, owned and disposed of by 
“consumers,” products containing valuable technical nutrients – cars, televisions, 
carpeting, computers, and refrigerators, for example, would be reconceived as 
services people want to enjoy … When they finish with the product, or are simply 
ready to upgrade to a newer version, the manufacturer replaces it, taking the old 
model back.54  
This is presented as beneficial to commerce and consumers: ‘people could indulge their 
hunger for new products as often as they wish, without guilt, and industry could 
encourage them do so with impunity.’55 Although such a model is generally perceived 
as most appropriate where goods have high acquisition and/or operating costs or are 
infrequently used or difficult to store,56 technology enables more efficient ways to 
identify, access, use, pay for, and dispose of more mundane and low-value goods.57 
Structuring ownership rights in a manner appropriate to circular economics 
therefore becomes essential: ‘Companies need to find ways to control the return flow’.58 
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56 Lacy and Rutqvist (n 12) 103. 
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There may well be differences in B2B and B2C contexts: consumers ‘are much more 
difficult to corral’,59 whilst businesses may be more reluctant to engage in certain types 
of transactional models that may aid circular economy (such as sharing).60 For both 
types of transaction though technology provides a means by which goods can be 
identified and controlled in this process.61 Circular economic practices such as “Product 
as a Service” need ‘a blend of physical and digital channels’ for dispositions.62 The 
digital element will ‘provide the connections needed to maintain a relationship far 
beyond the point of sale. [Smart technologies] enhance remote visibility and control of 
assets, which are especially critical [to circular economic models].’63 By smartening up 
objects, through integrating and embedding software into goods, control of the use of 
assets becomes viable, not just technically but legally as well. Blockchain may be one 
way of achieving this. There are other possibilities though which can provide the 
necessary level of control without having to wait for widespread adaptation of 
blockchain recordation technologies.  
This evidence about circular economic thinking towards smart goods produces a 
complex picture of interconnected and interacting goods and process. In light of the 
commercialised nature of a lot of circular economic writing, especially as exemplified 
in the use of the term intelligent assets, the emphasis on the potential for tracking and 
controlling smart goods beyond a point of first sale is expected. That such control can 
be achieved in a practical sense is examined further in the next section. The 
technological possibilities for control combined with the underlying policy basis for 
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such control provided by circular economic thinking, raises the question of what 
ownership of smart goods in a circular economy will actually look like. The precise 
nature of law’s response to such challenges is difficult to foresee. What will be 
examined here is the capacity that law currently provides to enable circular economic 
practices to develop, in particular the options law provides to those wishing to extend 
control over goods down a chain of transactions. 
3. Extending control and limiting ownership 
This section shows how the growing prevalence of smart technology enables corporate 
control of goods. The enhanced interactivity of even mundane goods is identified in the 
following sub-section. However, this can raise problems in the context of security 
issues, potentially even enabling third party disabling of smart goods. The implications 
in terms of quiet possession obligations under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 are also 
considered. Additionally there is analysis of the effects of this increasing interactivity in 
terms of how we understand control of objects. The second sub-section expands on this 
by examining the potential for digital colonisation of goods. This is assessed through 
analysis of two legal mechanisms for control of goods: using intellectual property rights 
(“IPR”) covering software, or, as is more likely, by using contractual tools to avoid 
difficulties thrown up by specific IP doctrines. Such combinations of legal and 
technological mechanisms suggest a profound alteration in ways of transacting over 
goods. Transactions can be framed as if they appear to be sales, whilst actually being 
characterised as merely licences for use (an appropriate approach to smart goods, not 
least due to the conceptual difficulties of leasing IPRs). Smart goods are, and will be, 
licensed rather than sold or leased, and how this is occurring and its implications will be 
scrutinized. 
3.1 Smartening up dumb objects: technological possibilities and commercial 
applications 
The increasingly pervasive nature of smart technology shows goods and software 
integrating at an exceptional rate and in deeper and more profound ways.64 Neologism 
becomes necessary to describe this socio-technological revolution: Hildbrandt, for 
example, deploys the notion of ‘“softwired” interconnected “everywheres”’.65 There is 
limited space to fully explore the nature of “smartness”,66 but Brenner’s 2007 
explanation still holds value:  
“[S]mart” technologies differ from traditional “dumb” technologies in two 
important respects: One is that thanks to artificial intelligence, “smart” 
technologies are capable of acting on their own. They can therefore work with us 
by anticipating our needs and fulfilling them; they can also replace us by taking 
over certain tasks, such as operating motor vehicles. The second difference is that 
“smart” technologies are meant to be, and will be, unobtrusive; as noted above, 
they will fade into the background and disappear from our awareness. This is why 
they are commonly referred to as “ambient” technologies.67 
The combined autonomy and ambience of smart technologies simultaneously provides 
‘the conduit through which our choices are delivered to us, the mirror by which we see 
ourselves reflected, and the lens that lets others see us on a level previously 
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unimagined.’68 The shape of the conduit, the angle of the mirror, the size of the lens will 
vary, meaning this mediating function invariably generates tension. Altering the shape 
of the conduit for choice-delivery for example, will determine not only the scope of our 
choices but even whether we effectively have choices. The capability of affecting, and 
even effecting, choice may in the future be present in very smart artefacts;69 certainly 
now smart environments can affect our relationships with things.70 Two broad “areas” 
of current and future goods-software integration illustrate such control possibilities. 
First is the application of smart technology to mundane objects, and the second is 
enhanced interactivity.71  
3.1.1 The application of smart technology to mundane objects 
Mundane objects such as washing machines,72 cookers,73 heating systems,74 locks,75 
toys,76 and so on are being smartened up as a result of technological developments. 
Most eye-catching is increasing connectivity between such objects, generating the 
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supposed IoT.77 There has been a considerable volume of scholarship and non-academic 
commentary on the IoT; what can be drawn from this is (i) the rapid expansion of 
connectable goods;78 and (ii) the resulting massive volumes of data.79 Greenfield thus 
accurately describes ‘the colonization of everyday life by information processing.’80 
Such developments present privacy and security issues,81 with liability issues 
also recognised.82 The ‘paradigm shift’ engendered by technological change enabling an 
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Secure by Design: Improving the cyber security of consumer Internet of Things Report (7 
March 2018) <www.gov.uk/government/publications/secure-by-design>.  
82 Braucher (n 7).  
IoT,83 is arguably significant enough to resist legal or academic conservatism cautioning 
against radical responses.84 As Ohm and Reid have noted of the US position, 2015 was 
a “year zero” in terms of agencies shifting heavily in the regulation of code, as an 
‘inevitable result of embedding software in everything. Physical functionality has been 
supplemented and replaced by code [meaning] … Agencies and regulators had to 
respond, whether or not they wanted to.’85 
Without disagreeing, this article’s focus is elsewhere. Instead of considering the 
regulatory challenges for governmental agencies, this article examines the potential 
generated by embedded software for control by producers and distributors of smart 
objects. In this sense, this article follows Brownsword’s distinction between regulation 
as a function of governmental agencies, and ‘controlling and channelling strategies’ 
where corporate or commercial organisations seek ‘to control and channel the 
purchaser’s use of the product.’86 This is an issue of sufficient importance so to justify 
analysis outside of intellectual frameworks of governmental regulation.87 It is also 
justified by the fact that government policy appears to shift responsibility to the private 
sector. The very recent Secure by Design report’s proposed Code of Practice makes 
clear that IoT objects should be subject to automated software updates, and 
unauthorised software changes should result in such objects being effectively prohibited 
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from connecting to the internet.88 Such software updates should ‘not impact the 
functioning of a device’,89 but this clearly leaves open the possibility of enhanced 
down-stream control of such objects. This reliance on private sector control is likely to 
complement moves towards circular economy, where a similar philosophy of private-
sector control predominates. 
An additional complicating factor concerning the security implications of 
smartening up mundane objects is that there is an additional layer of control between 
manufacturer and user, ie internet service providers, internet exchange points and other 
parties in the internet infrastructure. This becomes particularly relevant following the 
recent introduction of regulations implementing the EU Directive on Security of 
Network and Information Services (the NIS Directive).90 Regulation 10 imposes 
obligations on operators of essential services (OES) (such as internet exchange 
points),91 to take  
appropriate and proportionate technical and organisational measures to manage 
risks posed to the security of the network and information systems on which their 
essential service relies … [and] appropriate and proportionate measures to prevent 
and minimise the impact of incidents affecting the security of the network and 
information systems used for the provision of an essential service, with a view to 
ensuring the continuity of those services.92   
Such measures ‘must, having regard to the state of the art, ensure a level of security of 
network and information systems appropriate to the risk posed.’93 
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There are multiple possible implications arising due to the limited security 
capabilities of mundane smart goods and their susceptibility to infection by malware 
and being converted to operate as part of a botnet. The classic botnet operation is a 
distributed denial of service attack (DDoS); each individual unit within the botnet may 
not have any great processing power but the volumes of compromised units is what can 
affect the capacity to deal with data. This is ‘a hacker’s dream’.94 The Regulations 
define the security of network and information systems as  
the ability of network and information systems to resist, at a given level of 
confidence, any action that compromises the availability, authenticity, integrity or 
confidentiality of stored or transmitted or processed data or the related services 
offered by, or accessible via, those network and information systems.95  
In this sense, it may be that an appropriate method to deal with the risk of a massive 
DDoS is to disable individual units’ ability to access the internet. This area is subject to 
further interim guidance from the Office of Communications as the designated 
competent authority for digital infrastructure,96 though they admit that they have ‘had 
little time and opportunity to finalise any detailed guidance’.97 As such it merely refers 
to the National Cyber Security Centre’s guidance in understanding the meaning of the 
Regulation 10 obligations.98 This guidance, which includes the top-level objectives for 
cyber security (managing security risk, protecting against cyber attack, detecting cyber 
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security events, and minimising the impact of cyber security incidents), itself then refers 
to information provided by two different organisations,99 one US based (the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology) the other UK based (CREST), both of which set 
out that in dealing with a cyber security incident, it may be necessary to eradicate the 
threat through isolation, containment, alteration, or disabling access.100 The dynamism 
of technological evolution means that stricter definitions may not be sensible. As such 
the most that can be said is that as it stands, the guidance available does not prevent, and 
may even suggest the necessity of, the restriction of access to the internet of 
compromised devices. 
In the event of actions such as remote disconnection or disablement of smart 
goods, in order to meet the NIS requirements, would there be a breach of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 section 12(2)(b) warranty of quiet possession? What about the absence 
of a relationship between the ISP and either the user or the manufacturer? In such cases 
can the actions of the ISP in infringing possession generate liability under section 
12(2)(b)? The case-law on quiet possession only appears to cover disputes where there 
has been infringement of a third parties rights by the seller, not where the third party is 
acting under a legislative obligation in undertaking the infringing action.  
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Not all infringements with quiet possession are actionable.101 Thus in The 
Crudesky there was a factual infringement of possession by means of a ship being 
detained prior to the payment of a “fine” to a third party. This “fine” had no legal basis 
(it was basically a bribe) and as such this did not breach the statutory obligation.102 
However, where a third party had obtained an injunction as a result of the seller’s 
action, this would constitute a sufficiently acceptable causal relationship so that the 
actions of the third party could result in the seller’s infringement of the warranty of 
quiet possession.103 This may reveal a limitation to the section 12(2)(b) warranty of 
quiet possession: Bingham J has referred to ‘interference with possession or quiet 
enjoyment persisted in as a result of any act or omission of [the sellers] by any third 
party with whom they were in contractual relations’.104 In the situation noted above, 
there is of course no contractual relationship between the ISP and the manufacturer. The 
final words of Bingham J suggest there may not be liability. On the other hand, in The 
Playa Larga,105 the seller was involved in a decision by the seller’s government to 
withdraw a ship loaded with goods appropriated to the contract. This was held to breach 
the quiet possession obligation. This might suggest liability on the part of the seller in 
the hypothetical botnet scenario, but would depend on the extent to which a distinction 
could be drawn between the nature of the relationships involved. A more expansive 
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approach to quiet possession would suggest focusing more on the fact that there was a 
lawful interference not the fault of the buyer. Such an approach is suggested in 
Benjamin’s Sale of Goods: ‘It should also protect him against disturbance by the lawful 
acts of third persons, unless such disturbance is due to some act or omission on the part 
of the buyer or of a person deriving title from or connected with the buyer.’106 
Favouring the wider interpretation of the warranty of quiet possession would 
clearly impact on the sellers of mundane but otherwise smart goods. Reducing the risk 
of such objects joining a botnet (or some other cyber security incident) would be a 
reasonable way to address the potential for liability. Indeed, this may be the only 
workable response, in light of the potential scope of a wide warranty of quiet 
possession. Nevertheless, such increased cyber security may be accompanied by more 
positive benefits for circular economics. Two methods of increasing the security of 
smart objects can be set out: one, providing continual, automated security updates for an 
appropriate security programme to operate; two, closing off possible access to and from 
the smart object to different systems (essentially, providing the object’s user with only a 
limited operational capacity, perhaps by restricting the object to a particular corporate 
“ecosystem”). Both would be valuable approaches to take in circular economic contexts, 
as they allow corporate control of the goods over time. Moreover, as the recent Secure 
by Design report suggests the first option may well come to be the standard approach.107 
However, whilst the potential costs for the users of such goods may not be so 
considerable with individual goods taken alone, the combined volumes of mundane but 
smart goods may be such to result in significant negative impact from the effect of 
restrictions on the capacity and manner in which one can use the goods. In essence, the 
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broad question is whether we are willing for our smart goods to be subject to such 
control, especially when such control is neither voluntarily bargained for nor is it 
readily ascertainable exactly when such control may be activated. 
3.1.2 Enhanced interactivity 
The second area concerns interaction. Smart goods interact with human users, but they 
also interact with other things and the environment in general. The example par 
excellence is the smartphone. As Roberts CJ of the US Supreme Court noted four years 
ago, ‘modern cell phones, which are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life 
that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of 
human anatomy.’108 The increasing prevalence of smartphones, and the manner in 
which they are enmeshed into everyday life, only exacerbates this concern. We may 
arguably already have become cyborgs; it is only partly facetious to suggest that the 
name of one of the two dominant smartphone operating systems may imply that if we 
are not cyborgs, we may have android parasites. 
The dematerialisation of interaction,109  exemplified by smartphones, is 
fascinating and worrying at the same time. This interactivity always requires software; 
software is what makes things smart. Using smart technologies requires connection and 
interaction, whether knowingly or not, with other things and systems. In the current 
context of an effective duopoly between Apple and Android operating systems, 
smartphone users are confronted ‘with a choice to make about which corporate 
ecosystem they wish to participate in’.110 This makes a smartphone ‘an aperture onto the 
interlocking mesh of technical, financial, legal and operational arrangement that 
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constitutes a contemporary device and service ecosystem ... that we implicate ourselves 
in from the moment we purchase one.’111 Notably this is not a choice about whether to 
participate in such ecosystems; merely just which particular ecosystem you will have to 
participate in. One may of course be able to refuse to participate in any such system, by 
not using smart technologies. However, for the vast majority such a choice is 
unreasonable if not impossible. This is partly due to the ubiquity of such devices, but it 
is also because interactivity between objects and objects, objects and persons, and 
objects and the environment potentially results in controls of space, perception and 
action.112 Smart technologies and augmented realities113 may result in an ‘onlife’, a new 
world both in and between on-line and off-line worlds. This raises questions about the 
interaction between the ‘frontend (the world we see and navigate) and a backend (the 
largely invisible computational architecture that sustains and informs the frontend).’114 
For Hildebrandt this shift from ‘use to interaction’, 115 means we must ‘build 
contestation in to the heart of the upcoming cyberphysical architectures’.116  
Here we are concerned with how control of goods by software generates the 
need for such contestation. The control options arising through the integration of 
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software into mundane objects and the increasing interactivity of smart goods derive 
from two distinct (though not necessarily disparate) mechanisms. On one hand, 
technological control may well be built in to software, limiting the use of objects or 
obliging interaction with other objects or when in certain environments. On the other 
hand, legal control may be exercised through certain proprietary (IP law) or personal 
(contractual) legal mechanisms.117  
There are thus two problems for circular economic practices. The first is the task 
of ascertaining who exactly owns what. Mass interactivity requires and is generative of 
vast quantities of data, which can cause considerable difficulty in ascertaining 
ownership or proprietary rights, as well as related issues of use-rights.118 These 
problems are exacerbated by the failure in English law at least to even clarify what 
software actually is;119 a problem unresolved by the utilisation of “digital products” in 
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Property?’ [2009] 31 EIPR 396; Althaf Marsoof, ‘Digital content and the definition 
the Consumer Rights Act 2015.120 As such, ownership issues of smart technology (or 
“intelligent assets”) remain problematic.121 The need for strong down-stream control of 
goods in circular economics means the potential injection of rights-holders or sloughing 
off of use-rights at various stages raises questions about the capacity to control circular 
economies of smart goods with any degree of consistency or strength. 
The second problem for circular economies is the potential for, indeed the 
actuality of, corporate control of smart goods and the ways we can act with and through 
such things. As shown, circular economics demands control of goods, which can be 
effected by smart technology and implemented through control mechanisms inherent in 
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smart technology. However, creating a viable environment for the effective functioning 
of circular economic practices may result in a digital colonisation of goods, especially 
when legal control methods are combined with the technological mechanisms described 
above. 
3.2. The digital colonisation of goods  
The potential uses and dangers of hard (eg prohibiting copying) and soft digital rights 
management (eg allowing copying at the price of surveillance) has been long 
recognised, 122 and smart technology presents further such opportunities for control of 
goods in light of the ease of vertical integration of software and hardware.123 The 
effectively costless nature of replication of digital information reduces the relevance of 
scarcity, with Lemley suggesting this this may lead to attempts to control goods by IPR 
holders.124 The flip side of costless replication of digital information is a far greater 
capacity to introduce replicable control mechanisms into digital data (and thus 
embedded into smart objects): ‘as soon as digitization offers a method of control, it will 
be exerted.’125 Goods are becoming subjected to a form of legally-enforced imperialism 
of ownership: tangible things are controlled far down-stream of any production and/or 
retail of such things by means of functional control of software supported by legal 
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regimes structured around a concept of powerful and practically un-contestable IPRs.126 
This imperialism can be seen in numerous recent commercial actions, sometimes 
accidental and sometimes more deliberate. Earlier the cautionary tale of HP’s ink 
service was noted; further illustrations are instructive. In August 2017, a leading drone 
manufacturer informed owners they would be obliged to allow an update or the goods 
would be in effect stopped from working.127 In December 2017, a row broke out 
between Amazon and Google over the interaction and interoperability of different smart 
products as between the two platforms.128 At the same time, Apple admitted to 
deliberately slowing down older models of its iPhone, using software upgrades to 
modify battery performance;129 user backlash led to Apple providing the option to reject 
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such changes.130 Along similar lines, April 2018 saw reports that a new operating 
system update to iPhones had the effect of stopping the devices working if the screens 
had been repaired by third parties.131 Both these examples clearly demonstrate how 
control of the software can be utilised in order to exercise a form of ex post facto 
control over the use of the physical aspects of smart goods. Arguably, this is something 
akin to punishment for those users who dare to move outside the corporate ecosystem. 
The extent to which legal regimes can resolve such issues in favour of consumers or 
corporations is not entirely clear. Later it will be seen how Apple’s attempts to stop 
iPhones that had third party repairs has not been successful in Australia;132 the fact 
Apple appear to be attempting the same control in the UK arguably demonstrates that 
these instances of corporate control of smart goods is truly a salient issue. 
More accidentally, in 2017 Samsung sent an update to televisions which stopped 
them working.133 At the other end of the scale, the rise and fall of the Kodi box 
demonstrates the considerable power granted to IPR holders who are able to introduce 
technological rights control mechanisms, breach of which can lead to criminal 
liability.134 However, the breadth of this offence is such that a device which can 
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134 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, sections 296 – 296ZF. See eg Press Association, 
‘Trader who sold TV Kodi boxes enabling free streaming of paid content avoids jail’ The 
primarily be used for circumventing copyright protection mechanisms, but is not 
actually used for such a purpose, leads to liability.135 This illustrates a considerable 
power imbalance in favour of IPR holders. However, criminal enforcement may not 
even be necessary for IPR holders to exercise their considerable powers and 
substantially impact on the use of goods. This type of behaviour can be understood as 
part of a ‘strategy of vertical integration … to control the network, as well as the 
platforms, applications, physical devices and content that run on and are connected by 
it.’136  
This was demonstrated in 2009 by Amazon, who remotely deleted e-books 
(amusingly including Orwell’s 1984 and Animal Farm) from the Kindle e-readers they 
had been downloaded to.137 This was on the grounds that the e-books infringed 
copyright. This was without any consent or even knowledge on the part of the readers. 
In the decade since this incident, little appears to have been made of the implications of 
such behaviour. In 2010 Bradgate briefly suggested that such actions might be a breach 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 section 12(1), for infringing the owner’s quiet possession 
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of the e-reader.138 I have also previously argued that the complications in this area are 
enough to justify reforming section 12 in order to protect sub-purchasers.139 There is 
also no specific case-law, unsurprising considering the generally shallow pool of 
authority on section 12 generally. What perhaps comes closest is an unreported decision 
of the Court of Appeal from 1999, in Rubicon Computer Systems Ltd v United Paints 
Ltd.140 That case (which was decided ten years after the events) involved the installation 
of a ‘computer system’.141 There is no further detail on the nature of this system. The 
parties’ relationship broke down prior to payment of the full price. After this point, 
someone acting for the appellant ‘placed a device in the computer … called a time 
lock’.142 Whether the timelock is a physical device or part of the code was not 
considered. The timelock was activated some time later, rendering the computer useless 
and, by the time it was unlocked, obsolete. Mantell LJ, giving the judgment of the 
Court, held that this was an infringement of the buyer’s quiet possession and thus a 
breach of the sale of Goods Act 1979 section 12(2)(b).143 
The implications for an Amazon-style deletion of e-books are not clear. One 
approach might be that since section 12 only applies when there has been a sale, then if 
the acquisition of the e-book is by some other method then the section 12 protection is 
limited. This is of particular importance in light of the recent decision of the Supreme 
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Court in Bunkers, which showed the relative ease with which parties can contract out of 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979 in general.144 If this is possible, then it may allow for parties 
to get out of the obligations on quiet possession despite the general prohibition against 
contracting out of the section 12 obligations.145 In the event that the section 12 
obligations do carry over regardless of the type of contract, it may be possible to 
distinguish the sort of activity involved in the Amazon situation from that in Rubicon. 
The latter involved an unlawful interference, but the former is harder to characterise in 
the same way. The e-reader was not rendered inoperable. There is also the possibility 
that the terms of use may provide exceptions to any quiet possession warranty, for 
authorised interferences.146  
Differences in doctrine as well as policy may well pull legal regulation of smart 
technology in circular economy in different directions.147 However, another possible 
direction might be in terms of convergence, brought about by the borderless nature of 
digital information and thus of smart technology. For this reason it is worth considering 
various jurisprudential structures enabling IPR holders to control goods from different 
jurisdictions.148 From a US perspective, Fairfield argues the power of IPR holders raises 
the danger of a digital serfdom, and suggests a stronger and broader application of 
doctrine from tangible personal property law to prevent digital control through contracts 
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and IP law.149 Similarly, there is the provocative argument by Banta, who suggests that 
digitalisation has led to a development of a form of ‘digital feudalism’.150 She argues 
digital assets are generated by means of contractual agreements, and as such are 
subjected to contractual terms which may (often) impose obligations and prohibitions 
on use and alienation. These terms generate a feudal relationship between the relevant 
parties: 
Like the peasants under a true feudal system, account holders of today’s digital 
assets lack power over their digital assets. They receive what corporations allow 
them to receive and nothing more. In this sense, corporations are the true owners of 
digital assets and when account holders die, assets revert back to the companies 
from which account holders purchased or accumulated them. In present possessory 
estate terms, corporations own a fee simple interest in digital assets and lease these 
assets to customers for their limited use or for a limited time. Individuals own some 
kind of lesser interest like a leasehold or a life estate in digital assets.151 
The relationships between corporations and users of digital assets are characterised by 
absolutism (the users have no or minimal control over the terms of the agreement) and 
hierarchy and concentrated power (‘Companies are able to control the use of digital 
assets long after an individual has purchased it’152). She concludes by noting that this 
form of digital feudalism is extending towards goods:  
Beyond software and digital media, the trend is even beginning to apply to physical 
devices. Recently, Apple and cell phone carriers decided to license their physical 
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devices instead of sell them outright. Individuals pay an installment fee every 
month but do not own their phones. Rather, they lease the phones like they would 
expensive automobiles. … users will all be serfs in the system of ownership.153 
This connection between tangible and intangible rights and obligations, generated and 
then enforced by smart technology, provides the capacity to control the material by 
means of the immaterial.154 In the words of Kessler from 75 years ago, law may allow 
‘powerful industrial and commercial overlords . . . to impose a new feudal order of their 
own making upon a vast host of vassals.’155 As such, the centrality of this sort of 
corporate control to circular economy may require a radical reaction, or it may require 
us to drastically alter current notions of ownership or control of things because we have 
no control over the smart technology embedded in those things. 
 The implications of these control possibilities can be discerned in a number of 
recent practical examples. In February 2017, it was reported that the virtual reality 
headset sold by Oculus may be prohibited as a result of action concerning code used in 
the goods.156 July 2017 saw a report that Qualcomm was asking for a prohibition on 
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sales of iPhones for breach of their IPR by Apple.157 These disputes illustrate the 
potential for a binary use/non-use control option in the hands of IPR holders. From a 
circular economics perspective, the ideal result in such disputes would be the 
maintenance of such a control option, as it provides a potential mechanism for 
controlling the use of goods down a chain of transactions.  
On a slightly different path, considerable efforts have been made by corporate 
bodies to prevent users from repairing smart technologies. In the US, there have been 
numerous instances where companies such as Apple and John Deere have lobbied 
against the introduction of state level right to repair legislation, resulting in a fightback 
on the part of consumers and, importantly, non-consumers (farmers, in the case of John 
Deere).158 In a case, currently pending before the US Court of Appeals for the 11th 
Circuit, a computer refurbisher Eric Lundgren was found guilty of copyright 
infringement for replicating restore discs for Windows computers.159  
This area is likely to be the scene of considerable disputation in the future, as the 
extent of rights of repair, particularly in the case of smart technology, are worked out in 
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courts and legislatures. This is especially so in light of the limited contemporary right to 
repair legislation. Thus the EU’s right to repair and maintain vehicles,160 is merely a 
right to access, and is time and purpose limited,161 and is not necessarily free.162 More 
generally, there no longer appears to be a common law right to repair in copyright 
law,163 a profound lacuna for those repairing software. This is especially important if 
there is no obligation on manufacturers of smart technologies to update such 
technologies over a long period of time to maintain their security. In May 2018 it was 
reported that the Dutch consumer group Consumentenbond are failed to convince a 
court to require Samsung to update phones for at least four years after initially being 
sold.164 
A more repair-friendly approach can be possible, though it requires a broad 
understanding of a right to repair. Evidence of this comes from Australia. In April 2017 
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission took action against Apple’s 
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refusal, contrary to Australian consumer law, to repair faults where devices had been 
subject to otherwise unconnected third-party repairs.165 On 18 June 2018 Lee J of the 
Federal Court of Australia found that this practice was against Australian consumer law, 
fining Apple nine million dollars.166 This approach is to be applauded, especially in 
light of reports (noted above) that such practices are still occurring.167 Likewise, the US 
Federal Trade Commission has warned companies that “warranty void if removed” 
stickers are likely to be breaches of US consumer protection law.168 However, it remains 
to be seen whether it is applicable beyond the consumer-law context, for such rights are 
clearly of considerable value for commercial organisations, especially in circular 
economic contexts. 
It might be countered that the rules on exhaustion, or first sale, may demonstrate 
a fundamental weakness in IPR holders’ capacity to control goods. This particular issue 
has recently been considered by the US Supreme Court, first in the context of first sale 
of copyright in Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons, Inc in 2013,169 and then concerning 
exhaustion of patents in Impression Products, Inc v Lexmark International, Inc in 
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2017.170 It is worth considering these decisions, not least because of the likely impact on 
business practices in general, but also because of how the issue of control of goods 
through IPRs, via software, was considered. Thus, in Kirstaeng, the majority worried 
that refusing to extend the first-sale principle to goods sold abroad (in this case, 
textbooks) would have a chilling effect on sales generally.171 Breyer J (for the majority) 
wrote that first sale ‘frees courts from the administrative burden of trying to enforce 
restrictions upon difficult-to-trace, readily movable goods.’172 Furthermore, he said  
‘[t]echnology companies tell us that “automobiles, microwaves, calculators, mobile 
phones, tablets, and personal computers” contain copyrightable software programs 
or packaging … Many of these items are made abroad with the American copyright 
holder’s permission and then sold and imported (with that permission) to the 
United States. … A geographical interpretation would prevent the resale of, say, a 
car, without the permission of the holder of each copyright on each piece of 
copyrighted automobile software. Yet there is no reason to believe that foreign auto 
manufacturers regularly obtain this kind of permission from their software 
component suppliers.’173 
Thus it would seem that the law would prevent parties from exercising control over 
goods through the software.174 But this would be too broad a conclusion; rather, it 
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noted that ‘[17 US Code Annotated § 109(a)] now makes clear that a lessee of a copy 
will not receive “first sale” protection but one who owns a copy will receive “first sale” 
protection, provided, of course, that the copy was “lawfully made” and not pirated.’175 
This aspect would be repeated in Impression,176 which more clearly shows that whilst 
IPRs may not succeed in providing post-sale protection, contracts can. 
Impression had worked around digital rights management software embedded 
into Lexmark printer cartridges. This was to enable the unauthorised resale of such 
cartridges. Lexmark argued that this infringed its patent rights. The Supreme Court held 
that Lexmark’s sales of the cartridges would exhaust its rights.177 This meant that it 
could not bring an action for patent infringement. However, as Roberts CJ, giving the 
opinion of the majority, stated: ‘The single-use/no-resale restrictions in Lexmark’s 
contracts with customers may have been clear and enforceable under contract law, but 
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they do not entitle Lexmark to retain patent rights in an item that it has elected to 
sell.’178 Furthermore, the  
smooth flow of commerce would sputter if companies that make the thousands of 
parts that go into a vehicle could keep their patent rights after the first sale. Those 
companies might, for instance, restrict resale rights and sue the shop owner for 
patent infringement. And even if they refrained from imposing such restrictions, 
the very threat of patent liability would force the shop to invest in efforts to protect 
itself from hidden lawsuits. Either way, extending the patent rights beyond the first 
sale would clog the channels of commerce, with little benefit from the extra control 
that the patentees retain. And advances in technology, along with increasingly 
complex supply chains, magnify the problem.179 
It might therefore seem impossible to argue that IPR could control goods downstream. 
The Supreme Court in Impression Products and Kirtsaeng justified their decisions on a 
supposed common-law rule against alienation, drawing on Lord Coke.180 However, as 
Hovenkamp clearly shows, this alleged rule is much narrower than the Court supposed, 
and is probably irrelevant to the IP context (being more concerned with price 
maintenance in personal property, and perpetuity situations).181 Hovenkamp argues in 
favour of a restrictive approach to exhaustion rules, on the grounds that they can be 
socially beneficial. This may well be the case, though not in all situations (which I 
assume to be Hovenkamp’s position also); here I imply that the problem is not so much 
IP exhaustion or first sale rules, but the ways in which alternative forms of governance 
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and control of things can be imposed. The key is thus in the fact that the Supreme Court 
denied the possibility of an IPR action, and expressly left open the possibility of a 
contractual claim.182 On the face of it, this is cold comfort for IPR holders. Claims 
would be against the initial purchaser: resellers such as Impression would not be privy 
to such agreements and would avoid liability. Nevertheless, a more subtle process of 
control can be utilised, one which involves controlling the goods by virtue of 
controlling the software that makes smart technology work. Such behaviour would 
involve controlling the digital data, where exhaustion does not apply. This point, 
deriving from Capitol Records LLC v ReDigi Inc,183 was not mentioned in Impression 
Products and surely therefore remains US law.184 
This still leaves the problem that the US Supreme Court appears to expressly 
allow sales to counter any attempt to control by licence: 
a license is not about passing title to a product, it is about changing the contours of 
the patentee’s monopoly: The patentee agrees not to exclude a licensee from 
making or selling the patented invention, expanding the club of authorized 
producers and sellers … Because the patentee is exchanging rights, not goods, it is 
free to relinquish [by license] only a portion of its bundle of patent protections. A 
patentee’s authority to limit licensees does not, as the Federal Circuit thought, 
mean that patentees can use licenses to impose post-sale restrictions on purchasers 
that are enforceable through the patent laws. So long as a licensee complies with 
the license when selling an item, the patentee has, in effect, authorized the sale. … 
                                                 
182 ibid 1533: ‘whatever rights Lexmark retained are a matter of the contracts with its 
purchasers’. 
183 Capitol Records LLC v ReDigi Inc 934 FSupp2d 640 (USDC SD NY 2013) (no 
exhaustion/first sale rule for digital products); cf Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons, Inc 568 
US 519; 133 SCt 1351 (2013) (the first sale rule applies to copyright material sold 
overseas).  
184 cf Casey and Vigna (n 28) 235: blockchains may provide a mechanism whereby first sale can 
apply to digital assets. 
The purchasers might not comply with the restriction, but the only recourse for the 
licensee is through contract law, just as if the patentee itself sold the item with a 
restriction.185 
This appears comprehensive, but there is a limitation recognised by the Supreme Court 
itself: ‘the modest principle that, if a patentee has not given authority for a licensee to 
make a sale, that sale cannot exhaust the patentee’s rights [where ‘the purchaser 
participated in the licensee’s infringement’].186 Similarly, in the context of dismissing a 
claim about international patent exhaustion, the Supreme Court reiterated ‘the basic 
premise that only the patentee can decide whether to make a sale that exhausts its patent 
rights in an item.’187 The question that arises is whether or not this is just a ‘modest 
principle’ as the Court put it.  
In a recent exhaustive analysis of the potential for conflict between copyright 
and contract, Rub claims, with considerable force, that despite a tendency towards 
allowing contracts to dominate (by the process of avoiding any pre-emption in favour of 
Federal copyright law), there has not been a commensurate ‘doomsday scenario of 
countless standard-form agreements … that would significantly restrict users’ rights’ in 
the US.188 He notes that there is only limited evidence from reported case-law of 
contracts being utilised as a means of getting around copyright’s limitations, with the 
additional factor that challenges may be rigorously defended not least by users’ rights 
                                                 
185 137 S Ct 1523, 1534-35. 
186 ibid 1535, following General Talking Pictures Corp v Western Elec Co 305 US 124 (1938). 
187 ibid 1537, following Boesch v Graff 133 US 697 (1890). 
188 Guy A Rub, ‘Copyright Survives: Rethinking the Copyright-Contract Conflict’ (2017) 103 
Va L Rev 1141, 1202.  
groups and the like.189 Furthermore, he suggests contract law is too inefficient a 
mechanism even if creators wished to control users.190  
There is a distinction to be drawn here though. Rub focused on ‘standard-form 
agreements with “no parody,” “no criticism,” and “no usage of ideas” clauses’, where 
the absence of litigation shows contract cannot effectively ‘exercise tight control on a 
large scale over information and information goods.’191 There is a considerable 
difference between using contract (however unsuccessfully) to attempt to control 
parody or criticism, and using contracts to structure the use of smart technology. 
Technological developments may be a reason why decisions over the last couple of 
decades may not reveal disputes; it must be acknowledged that corporate disputes 
continue to brew on these issues.192 Thus in the Apple and Qualcomm dispute 
mentioned above,193 the effect of Impression Products is that there is an incentive on the 
patentee to avoid exhaustion, by claiming that the disputed technology is not covered by 
the disputed patent:194 doing so provides a stronger claim for down-stream control.195  
                                                 
189 ibid 1209 fn 287. 
190 ibid 1210-1221. 
191 ibid 1211. 
192 cf BBC News ‘Disney loses in Redbox copyright row’ BBC News (22 February 2018) 
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-43154671>. This dispute concerns the capacity of 
Redbox to use access codes for digital services that Disney attempted to protect using 
words like ‘not for sale or transfer’. At the US District Court, California, Central Division, 
District Judge Pregerson refused Disney’s claim for a preliminary injunction. The report is 
at <www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Disney-Redbox-TRO-
DENIAL.pdf.> This report indicates though that Redbox failed to make out that there had 
been a first sale, on the grounds that there was no material object in existence at the 
relevant time. 
193 See n 157. 
194 Hovenkamp (n 181) 28, citing Apple, Inc v Qualcomm Inc., Case No. 17-cv-0108-GPC-
MDD (S.D. Cal. June 20, 2017) (Redacted First Amended Complaint…). 
The potential negative implications here become clear, in circular economy 
contexts, where control mechanisms focusing on software that gives smart technology 
its functionality are of considerable value. They enable the tracking of material that is 
essential to circular economy practices, but they also enable determination of how 
goods are used (if they are used at all). On this matter there appears to be a divergence 
of opinion as to the implications of Impression Products. Barnett and Sichelman suggest 
that Impression Products  
impedes the efficient design of technology supply chains … The Court’s 
formalistic reasoning stands far removed from the transactional intricacies of 21st-
century technology markets. As a result, it overlooks the perverse consequences 
that a blanket application of the exhaustion doctrine is likely to cause for the multi-
step supply chains that link innovators with consumers.196 
On the other hand Perzanowski suggests that Impression Products is a good decision, 
showing that  
                                                                                                                                               
195 cf Frederick M Abbott, ‘Case Comment: Comment on the US Supreme Court decision 
Impression Products v Lexmark International’ (2017) International Review of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law 889, 891: ‘Advances in technology and increasingly 
complex supply chains magnify the potential problems created by post-sale patent 
restrictions. The Supreme Court put an end to them. … A foreseeable consequence of the 
distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between sales and licenses is to encourage efforts 
by patent owners to characterize transactions as licenses where they intend to restrict the 
activities of technology users. … Here in Impression Products the Supreme Court may 
have set itself up for revisiting the sale/license distinction once the consequences of this 
new decision are played out.’ Claiming that such disputes as these are ended, yet at the 
same time a revisiting of such disputes will occur, is contradictory. 
196 Jonathan Barnett and Ted Sichelman, ‘Does The Supreme Court Understand The Innovation 
Economy?’ Forbes (12 July 2017) <www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/07/12/does-the-
supreme-court-understand-the-innovation-economy/#79239d432a2b>. 
restrictions on alienation and use of the patented good are not enough to overcome 
a sale … Unless the Supreme Court’s full-throated embrace of patent exhaustion 
was nothing more than an exercise in empty formalism … Lexmark may actually 
help clarify the longstanding murkiness in copyright law over the license/sale 
distinction.  
Also, he suggests that  
at least until 3D printing becomes a widespread reality, the distribution of most 
patented goods will remain decidedly tangible. If so, leasing models won’t be very 
appealing, especially for low-dollar-value goods. Patent holders would need to 
create and enforce systems for collecting ongoing payments and expired products 
from consumers, an expense likely not justified by the harm of secondary 
markets.197 
However, as shown above, this sort of behaviour is happening, and is part of the circular 
economic ideal. The focus in Impression Products is clearly on ‘the club of authorized 
producers and sellers’; users (which would include commercial as well as non-
commercial users) seem to be outside the analysis presented by the Supreme Court. 
Such control of use is best enforced by avoiding sales,198 and as has been shown circular 
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198 Licences are used by software companies precisely because they provide a way around first 
sale doctrines: Christian H Nadan, ‘Software licensing in the 21st century: Are software 
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Rub (n 188) 1158 fn 69 (suggesting that judicial restriction of IPRs holders using 
economic thought strongly favours non-sale transactions.199  
In England, the position is (notwithstanding the future implications of Brexit) 
governed by the UsedSoft v Oracle decision of the CJEU.200 There it was held that there 
can be exhaustion of digital software provided that certain requirements are met. There 
has to have been a sale, which encompasses licences of unlimited duration.201 It has also 
been indicated that changing the medium does not translate the exhaustion to the new 
medium if there is no authorisation from the copyright holder.202 Everything will thus 
turn on the extent of authorisation and the nature of the inevitable licence.203 The full 
meaning of UsedSoft is unclear, and it has not been considered by UK courts in depth, 
though as Savič has noted German courts have taken a restrictive approach.204 Most 
recently the questions have been set in the Tom Kabinet case before the CJEU.205 This 
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201 [2016] Case C-166/15 Ranks v Microsoft; Sanna Wolk, ‘Case Comment: CJEU holds that 
reproduced copies cannot be resold’ (2017) 39 EIPR 125. 
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Vasiļevičs’ (2017) 33 CLS Rev 521, 525 
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33 ECLR 545, 551.  
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and CJEU case law’ (2015) 37 EIPR 414. 
205 C-263/18 Nederlands Uitgeversverbond and Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet BV 
(at <www.gov.uk/government/publications/references-to-the-court-of-justice-of-the-
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June 2018)). 
case concerns the application of UsedSoft to the resale of digital books.206 It is hoped 
that clarification as to the applicability of the exhaustion principles to digital books will 
result. However, it is unlikely, on the basis of the questions set, that there will be 
clarification as to the applicability of exhaustion to smart goods. Moreover, the framing 
of the questions in Tom Kabinet, focusing on situations where there has been a 
download for an unlimited time at a commercial price (‘remuneration equivalent to the 
economic value of the work’), suggests that the need to focus on the characterisation of 
the transaction (as a licence or something more akin to a sale) will continue. 
The importance of the character of the transaction has recently been 
demonstrated by the Supreme Court in the Bunkers decision.207 There it was held that a 
retention of title clause could have the effect of taking a transaction outside the scope of 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979; instead there could be a sui generis sale. The implications 
of this decision are as yet unclear, but Gullifer is surely right to suggest there will be 
‘far reaching consequences’.208 What does seem likely, in light of the non-applicability 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 framework, is that transactions where title is retained 
will require very specific negotiation at the outset, or very close post-contractual 
analysis in the event of breach, in order to accurately set out or ascertain the respective 
rights and duties. This becomes important in light of the general notion, expressed by 
                                                 
206 Saba Sluiter, ‘The Dutch courts apply UsedSoft to the resale of eBooks’ (28 January 2015) at 
<copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2015/01/28/the-dutch-courts-apply-usedsoft-to-the-
resale-of-ebooks/>. 
207 PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC v OW Bunker Malta Ltd [2016] UKSC 23; [2016] AC 1034.  
208 Louise Gullifer, ‘“Sales” on retention of title terms: is the English law analysis broken?’ 
(2017) 133 LQR 244, 254. See also Andrew Tettenborn, ‘Of Bunkers and Retention of 
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the Supreme Court in Marks & Spencer v BNP Paribas,209 that where parties obtain the 
benefit of legal advice in negotiating bargains, they are to be held to such bargains.  
Developments in circular economy, along with other technological changes that 
enabled more effective control of use of tangibles, provide both a policy justification 
and the technological capacity to practically achieve outcomes meeting that policy. 
These factors must be viewed in combination with doctrinal frameworks allowing for 
sale-like transactions to be formally categorised as non-sales, and the recognised impact 
of having professional advice on negotiated bargains.210 This is because whilst retention 
of title clauses are ordinarily utilised in order to provide security for supplies of goods 
on credit terms,211 this is not the only possible use for such terms. There is nothing in 
the doctrine that prevents retention of title clauses from being used for other purposes 
alongside, or even regardless of, the provision of credit.  
Therefore, in such commercial contexts, we may be able to see the beginnings of 
a radical shift in the use of contracted-control, specifically a substantial increase in the 
use of licences at the expense of sale. It may be countered that such changes are 
acceptable as means of effectively delineating the various rights (use-rights as well as 
rights to the value in assets) and obligations between competent commercial parties. 
However, adopting such a position must necessarily be accompanied by acceptance that 
licensing provides an opportunity for considerable down-stream control to be exercised, 
and as can be seen with the jurisprudence on either side of the Atlantic, such moves may 
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actually result in protections devised for down-stream purchasers against up-stream IPR 
holders being avoided. 
It is acknowledged that consumer law may prohibit the introduction of 
contractual terms of the sort necessary to obtain this down-stream control. The 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 provides both a general good faith obligation (section 62) 
and the “grey list” (section 63 and schedule 2) of prohibited terms. However, it is not 
entirely clear what the possible application of that doctrine might be, or indeed whether 
circular economy policy would justify alteration or escape from such prohibited terms. 
Detailed analysis of this issue must be left to another time, but it is worth noting that 
Hoffman has argued that some firms have benefited from creating contractual terms of 
use that attempt to manage or influence consumer behaviour by means other than strict 
and exhaustive prohibitions of the sort usually found in end-user licensing 
agreements.212 However, as Perzanowski and Schultz put it: ‘Private actors should not 
be in a position to define what owners can do with their property, even if they write the 
next generation of license agreements in a more consumer-friendly way.’213  
4. Conclusion 
Circular economy requires long-term control of products along chains of transactions. 
Identifying, locating, and controlling goods down-stream is easier in light of 
developments in digitalisation and embedded software leading to smart goods. 
However, Greenfield’s elucidations of the dangers of smart cities can be applied equally 
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to circular economies,214 and is worth citing in full: 
There is an implicit theory, a clear philosophical position, even a worldview, 
behind all of this effort. We might think of it as an unreconstructed logical 
positivism, which among other things holds that the world is in principle perfectly 
knowable, its contents enumerable and their relations capable of being 
meaningfully encoded in the state of a technical system, without bias or distortion. 
As applied to the affairs of cities, this is effectively an argument that there is one 
and only one universal and transcendentally correct solution to each identified 
individual or collective human need; that this solution can be arrived at 
algorithmically, via the operations of a technical system furnished with the proper 
inputs; and this that solution is something which can be encoded in public policy, 
again without distortion. (Left unstated, but strongly implicit, is the presumption 
that whatever policies are arrived at in this way will be applied transparently, 
dispassionately and in a manner free from politics.) Every single aspect of this 
argument is problematic.215 
Whilst circular economy has a laudable policy goal, an uncritical approach to its 
application cannot be justified. Law’s approach to smart technology, resting on archaic 
conceptualisations of software and the tangible-digital relationship, as well as 
proprietary and contractual regimes that impact heavily on the capacity to use and 
dispose of smart objects, raises significant problems which circular economy advocates 
appear to elide over or misunderstand. A further complication arises by the very nature 
of the combinatory interactivity that is generated and enforced by smart technology.  
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Escaping this control may be more complex than simply “bricking” goods,216 as 
control options provided by smart technology are both outward and inward facing. My 
smartphone gathers data about me. It can also gather data about other smart technology. 
And other smart technology can gather data about me, regardless of whether I am at that 
point using any smart technology. Engagement with smart technology and its control 
possibilities is vast and increasing with technological envelopment of social life. What 
matters thus is not just what I allow in terms of smart technology, but what others can 
achieve vis-à-vis my onlife, and more importantly, that I may not even know what it is 
that such others know and can do about my onlife.217  
What is really going to be radical is not a new form of smartphone, or a new 
process for making stuff, or a new type of networked software or blockchain ledger. 
Instead it will be some combination of different technologies.218 Yet circular economic 
thought progresses as if these combinations can be effectively planned and controlled: it 
is as if we can truly be in  
a cybernetic ecology 
where we are free of our labors 
and joined back to nature, 
returned to our mammal 
brothers and sisters 
and all watched over 
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by machines of loving grace.219 
The naivety of such a view may not however prevent its actualisation. Different 
regulatory and doctrinal structures generating and enforcing jurisprudential silos for 
different areas of law allows for control mechanisms to reach through to users. As such, 
any moves towards circular economy must be accompanied by critical analysis of an 
ideological foundation that presupposes the beneficial status of down-stream corporate 
control of tangibles through manipulation of intangible rights and obligations. 
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